@InProceedings{ZLLY05,
  author =	 {Sheng Zhong and Li Erran Li and Yanbin Grace Liu and
                  Yang Richard Yang},
  title =	 {On Designing Incentive-Compatible Routing and
                  Forwarding Protocols in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks---An 
                  Integrated Approach Using Game Theoretical and 
                  Cryptographic Techniques},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Eleventh {ACM} Annual
                  International Conference on Mobile Computing and
                  Networking (Mobicom)},
  year =	 2005,
  address =	 {Cologne, Germany},
  month =	 {August},
  abstract =	 {In many applications, wireless ad-hoc networks are
                  formed by devices belonging to independent
                  users. Therefore, a challenging problem is how to
                  provide incentives to stimulate cooperation. In this
                  paper, we study \emph{ad-hoc games}---the routing
                  and packet forwarding games in wireless ad-hoc
                  networks. Unlike previous work which focuses either
                  on routing or on forwarding, this paper investigates
                  both routing and forwarding. We first uncover an
                  impossibility result---there does not exist a
                  protocol such that following the protocol to always
                  forward others' traffic is a {\em dominant
                  action}. Then we define a novel solution concept
                  called {\em cooperation-optimal protocols}. We
                  present Corsac, a cooperation-optimal protocol
                  consisting of a routing protocol and a forwarding
                  protocol. The routing protocol of Corsac integrates
                  VCG with a novel cryptographic technique to address
                  the challenge in wireless ad-hoc networks that a
                  link's cost (\ie, its {\em type}) is determined by
                  two nodes together. Corsac also applies efficient
                  cryptographic techniques to design a forwarding
                  protocol to enforce the routing decision, such that
                  fulfilling the routing decision is the {\em optimal}
                  action of each node in the sense that it brings the
                  maximum utility to the node. Additionally, we extend
                  our framework to a practical radio propagation model
                  where a transmission is successful with a
                  probability. We evaluate our protocols using
                  simulations. Our evaluations demonstrate that our
                  protocols provide incentives for nodes to forward
                  packets.}
}